Thursday, 18 February 2010

Blogging on the New Diplomacy in 2010: New Premises

This blog constitutes my first attempt at using a group blog on a class-taught module. While it had a number of clear benefits in terms of developing students' writing and enabling them to comment on each other's work, there were some problems. Not least was the fact that on a blog with 50 students all posting their entries at similar times on similar themes, the blog became repetitive and overloaded. To address this problem, I have set up seven groups blogs of ten or so students each for the current semester. Please follow and comment on their work on the following blogs:

http://newdiplomacy2010a.blogspot.com/
http://newdiplomacy2010b.blogspot.com/
http://newdiplomacy2010c.blogspot.com/
http://newdiplomacy2010d.blogspot.com/
http://newdiplomacy2010e.blogspot.com/
http://newdiplomacy2010f.blogspot.com/
http://newdiplomacy2010g.blogspot.com/

Sunday, 31 January 2010

How can means used in 'public diplomacy' facilitate this incident?

Although it has been a while since we completed the 'New Diplomacy' module with Steven, I just wanted to share something which has been in the news for quite some time now.

Back in October (23rd) last year, a British couple Rachel and Paul Chandler were kidnapped by Somali pirates whilst sailing along the Indian Ocean on their yacht. Three months on, and the British couple remain in pirate's hand. David Miliband, Foreign Secretary, has made clear that the British government will not get involved in any 'ransom payment' in order to secure the release of Mr and Mrs Chandler. Miliband further deliberates that the British government has never been attracted to the idea of making 'concessions' to 'hostage-takers', rendering such incident plus the request to 'oblige' (by paying the demanded 'random') is not in Britain's interests.

This kind of response reminds me of Peter R. Neumann's claim when he said that 'democracies must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. Negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermine actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Talks can destabilize the negotiating governments' political systems, and undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism' (Neumann, R. P (2007), 'Negotiating With Terrorists', Foreign Affairs on-line).

Returning to the Somali pirates case, would Britain's reaction in a way be representing its 'commitment' and 'compliance' with internationally accepted measurements in countering piracy?

British High Commissioner, Rob Macaire, based in Kenya, informed the BBC (in the early aftermath of the incident) that: '...our main concern is to make them understand that what they are doing is entirely unjustified and that they should release the Chandlers immediately and unconditionally'.

From a 'new diplomacy' point of view, British government response to the £4.3 million random demanded by the pirates resembles a form of 'hard power'. 'Hard power' in this context involves the British government and its foreign affairs officials to engage in (via 'media' channels) 'disciplining' the 'wrong-doers (pirates), and reaffirm the international protocol against such unjust activities. Despite the application of 'hard power', Whitehall officials and the government have an expert 'hostage negotiator' on stand-by as the event unravel.

Could the Somali pirate's reluctance to release the Chandlers be due to the fact that a similar hijacking (on the 29th November, 2009) of a Greek supertanker 'Marcan Centaurus' (carrying a $156 million worth of oil/or equivalent to two million barrels of oil) by another pirate gang off the coast of Somalia...successfully received a $7 million ransom as they freed the Greek ship..

Similar outcomes also apply for the Saudi-owned 'Sirius Star' supertanker, it was hijacked in November 2008, and freed in January 2009, as the hijackers received a concession of $3 million in ransom.